Development of Submarine Command - Historical Considerations

Introduction

In western allied navy parlance, submarines are referred to as ‘boats’. Their early 20th century introduction into western navies was viewed by many senior officers as of insufficient consequence to be considered as warships, hence the (initially intended) derogatory referral to them as ‘boats’; a ‘label’ now taken as a term of endearment by those who operate them – even though they are now recognised as the capital warships of modern navies.

Prior to World War I, knowledge relating to command of a submarine was passed on from a boat's commander to his replacement. However high attrition rates during the war meant this training could not always be passed on, and the less experienced submarine commanders were in turn more likely to make errors resulting in the loss of the boat. In 1917, the Royal Navy established the COQC for potential commanding officers.

Dialogue

'Perisher' (as the non-USN allied Submarine Command Course is better known - owing to the fact the course used to be called the "Periscope School" and those officers attending being referred to as 'Perishers') is a 24-week course that officers must take prior to serving as Commanding Officer of an allied conventional submarine, or an Executive Officer on board a nuclear-powered Royal Navy Submarine. It has been run twice a year since 1917. It is widely regarded as one of the toughest command courses in the world. In 2020-21 the Royal Australian Navy undertook the planning and design of their own ‘Submarine Command Course’. The first of the RAN SMCC’s was run in 2022

The Royal Navy style Submarine Command Course - ‘Perisher’ – Is ‘Rigorous Assessment Method’ (RAM) Pass or Fail course. A methodology followed by many other Navies including the Netherlands, Norway, Canada and Australia. The United States Navy Submarine Command Course (USN SCC), attended by Prospective Commanding Officers’ (PCO) and Prospective Executive Officers (PXO) together, and it selects its students through a filtered process throughout a USN submarine officer’s career. Those selected for the USN SCC course are posted either to command or second-in-command on successful completion of the course. Similar to the RAN and RN method, there is a Pass or Fail element, however, failures are low in numbers. USN SCC Instructors, also known as PCOIs, are charged with developing submarine COs and XOs who are both bold and confident.

Submarine command courses prepare officers for submarine command through a process of both tactical appreciation and assessment. The price of failure can be high, and while success allows assignment to command, it does not guarantee a successful command. The Submarine Command Course is neither a warfare course nor an academic exercise. It tests leadership, professional knowledge, the desire for excellence, aggressiveness, and a hunger for submarine command. The central focus of the Submarine Command Course is to teach future commanding officers to make good command decisions. Generally there are three types of decisions: tactical, analytical and intuitive.

To make analytical decisions one weighs options, balancing risk and gain. This type of decision-making is well understood and is used often by submarine commanding officers. While this is a necessary strength for command, it is neither sufficient, nor a good predictor of tactical or leadership performance.

Intuitive decisions are made after one detects cues and patterns that emerge from complex situations and then chooses a course of action that likely will be successful. The action chosen is based on experience-the person has seen similar situations and draws on a “library” of responses (mental models). Based on recognizing the situation that faces him/her, the decider quickly converges on a course of action and runs a mental simulation of the action. If the simulation ends with success, he executes that option. If the simulation is not successful, he quickly makes adjustments to correct the difficulty or tries another model, running through the process again, until he finds a successful course of action to take. It is important to realize intuitive decisions are made quickly compared to analytical decisions, and the decider is not comparing options. If the first projected course of action works, he/she executes.

Perisher/SCC Course does not teach the candidates how to ‘drive’ a submarine – they would not have been given a recommendation for the course if they did not have those skills. ‘Teacher’ / PCOI generates scenarios and pressure so the candidates can recognise their own limitations, when exercising command (understanding that those, of each officer, are different). The main reasons for failing the RAM style ‘Perisher’ are that the candidate regularly loses situational awareness, or shows a narrow focus or over-reliance on one tool or aspect of operations. Making mistakes does not cause a student to fail automatically, as long as the mistake is recognised and corrected before the submarine is endangered. The maxims that each candidate must adhere to are: stay safe, remain undetected then get on with the mission – in that order.

Considerations for the Future.

The first class of nuclear-powered submarines to be acquired by Australia will be the USN VIRGINIA Class of submarines. Later in the acquisition process, the joint RN/RAN designed AUKUS SSN will be a joint building programme.

AUKUS will inevitably bring together two different systems for selecting and training submarine commanding officers – the USN SCC Course and the RN RAM style ‘Perisher’ SM Commanding Officer Qualifying Course. The initial acquisition by Australia of USN VIRGINIA Class SSNs followed later by the jointly designed UK and Australian AUKUS SSN, will require a focussed, independent consideration by all three navies of the most appropriate CO, or indeed XO, selection process to cover this evolutionary acquisition process.

Submarine command teams – now and increasingly in the future - are facing an increasing challenge of manipulating escalating amounts of data and information as crew numbers are set to decrease and whilst submarine related detection / counter-detection organic and networked sources are exponentially expanding. In these high-pressure environments, understanding and optimising how information is acquired, filtered, fused distributed and is presented/displayed is critical; particularly under conditions of hostility when employing weapons.

• Changes to the sources/management of information which drive the three maxims of submarine operations: Staying Safe, Remaining Undetected and Achievement of the Aim.
• Adapting Command Team structure and training to maximise the value of escalating amounts of data and information.
• Rules of Engagement: Potential Influences from changes in Societal, Ethical and Moral values.
• Use of Lethal Force from UUVs – Command Analysis and Judgement; Rules of Engagement

Data Management

Submarine command teams – now and increasingly in the future - are facing an increasing challenge of manipulating escalating amounts of data and information as crew numbers are set to decrease and whilst submarine related detection / counter-detection organic and networked sources are exponentially expanding. In these high-pressure environments, understanding and optimising how information is acquired, filtered, fused distributed and is presented/displayed is critical; particularly under conditions of hostility when employing weapons.

Changes to the sources/management of information which drive the three maxims of submarine operations: Staying Safe, Remaining Undetected and Execution of the Mission.

Other Considerations

As indicated above, Rapid developments in applied maths and sciences, with the potential application of quantum computing, AI, human/machine interactions, and the use of robotics are all areas impacting on current and future submarine/underwater system developments.

Adapting Command Team structure and training to maximise the value of escalating amounts of data and information.

Adherence to First World Democratic Rules-Based Values and Conformance with International law, in relation to:

• Rules of Engagement:
• Potential Influences from changes in Societal, Ethical and Moral values.
• Use of Lethal Force from UUVs – Command Analysis and Judgement

Adapting the creation of interest, recruitment attraction and retention to adapt to, and accommodate, contemporary societal values and expectations.